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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT In recent years, China's law enforcement officials have shown growing concern over the increase in illegal drug trafficking from Afghanistan and the "Golden Crescent" region into China's western region of Xinjiang. This report provides an analysis and a draft translation of a 2009 open source Chinese police article which presents an unusually detailed picture of China's concerns about this drug trafficking. The article spotlights China's anxieties about growing links between domestic Chinese traffickers-especially Xinjiang residents-and Central Asian-based international drug rings; the increasing role of Nigerians and other nationalities in this trade, and the challenges this trend creates for Chinese investigators; the evolving transport routes these traffickers use to cross the Chinese border, and: the increasing sophistication of these international traffickers. Such open source Chinese police publications can support analyses of Asian drug trends and facilitate exchanges with Chinese government officials about sensitive topics such as drug trafficking. 
SUBJECT TERMS
Introduction to the Research Article and the Authors
In the past decade, Chinese law enforcement officials have grown increasingly concerned about the inflow of heroin and other illegal drugs from Afghanistan and the broader "Golden Crescent" region into western China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) . A 2009 open source article in a Chinese police journal presents an unusually detailed picture of these police concerns. The authors, public security analysts Guo Jie and Mei Songlin, are researchers in the criminal investigation studies department of the Xinjiang region's top police academy, located in the regional capital of Urumqi. Their article appears in the police academy's academic journal, one of the more authoritative publications that would address this relatively narrow law enforcement policy issue. 
The Golden Crescent Drug Threat to China-Growing Scale and Shifting Organization
Guo and Mei's central point is that the threat China faces from Golden Crescent drugsespecially heroin-has risen steadily since 1991 and especially since 2005. Over the past decade, Chinese police evaluate that the drug trafficking challenge from this region has surpassed that from Golden Triangle drugs. They believe that China is now one of the four major international transshipment routes for illegal drugs flowing out of the Golden Crescent.
The authors also see a major shift in the organization of this traffic. They contend that large-scale international drug-smuggling rings have increasingly come to dominate this trade, replacing what they characterize as the small-scale, piecemeal drug trafficking from this region that was typical in the 1990s and early 2000s. 1 Moreover, they see international drug rings increasingly linking up with domestic Chinese drug-traffickers, who transship these drugs from Kashgar and Urumqi in Xinjiang on to the major cities of China's east coast-Shanghai, Beijing and especially Guangzhou. From there the heroin is either sold domestically or is further processed, shipped back out of China, and sold by gangs operating in Southeast Asia.
Chinese Police Identify Key Drug Shipment Routes
The article provides an overview of the major highway, air, and railway links that traffickers use to move drugs into Xinjiang, and notes several major shipping cases that Chinese, Pakistani, and Afghan police have cracked.
• Golden Crescent drug traffickers move heroin to Kashgar and Urumqi primarily via several highway routes from Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and by air from Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore, Kabul, and Dubai.
• Guo and Mei do not indicate that northern routes across the Kazakh or Mongolian borders are significant avenues for drug shipment into Xinjiang.
• They also assert that international railway lines, in contrast to highways and air routes, are "not especially prominent" avenues for moving drugs into Xinjiang in recent years.
• Guo and Mei believe, however, that a newly opened China-KyrgyzstanUzbekistan rail extension (which transits right through the heart of the region in which the authors claim that most trafficking takes place) will present new challenges for law enforcement.
The "Internationalization" of Traffickers' Backgrounds Raises New Institutional Challenges for Law Enforcement
The article notes an "internationalization" of the ethnic backgrounds of drug smugglers coming into Xinjiang. The authors assert that Central Asians and Africans-especially Nigerians-are playing an increasing role in smuggling drugs into and back out of China. By 2006 the "main body" of foreign drug smugglers encountered by Xinjiang police were from Pakistan and Nigeria, with others coming from Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries, Ghana and other African states, and Southeast Asia.
This report also strongly suggests that the broadening ethnic backgrounds of cross-border traffickers are creating growing institutional and linguistic obstacles for Chinese police in their investigations and interrogations. Guo and Mei do not see this "internationalization" of traffickers as accidental, and they complain about the increasingly "obscure" languages spoken by these traffickers. They charge that "these deliberately create a linguistic obstacle to prevent [traffickers] from confessing the facts of the crime, and delay the progress of [our] interrogations, and set up barriers to in-depth investigation of cases."
Traffickers' Increasing Sophistication Creates Technical Challenges to Detection
Guo and Mei assert that drug traffickers are demonstrating increasing sophistication in concealment, processing, and packaging drugs that transit the Chinese border. Much of this sophistication focuses on the concealment of drugs inside the bodies of human "mules," within the frames of vehicles, and among large shipments of commercial commodities. Guo and Mei note, in particular, the increasingly "professional" quality of drug packaging used by traffickers, including packaging that is resistant to detection and physical deterioration as it is carried within the human body. Chinese police also report that drug gangs are "continuously" adapting their techniques to counter Chinese law enforcement operations as a result of "active inquiries about the investigatory and inspection methods and tactics used by [Chinese] departments" that these drug rings are making.
Challenges Created by the Rise in Chinese Domestic Drug Networks, Especially Among Xinjiang Citizens
Although the bulk of Guo and Mei's article focuses on the role of foreign drug rings coordinating drug trafficking, the final sections concede that networks of thousandsprobably tens of thousands-of Xinjiang citizens are playing an increasing role in trafficking Golden Crescent drugs throughout China. Guo and Mei cite nationwide and provincial figures that indicate a sharp increase in the number of these Xinjiang residents who have been arrested for trafficking in other provinces from 2000 onward. They attribute this trend to a variety of factors-economic difficulties in China's impoverished interior, ethnic tensions, recidivism and drug addiction among ex-criminals, and other forces.
Although Guo and Mei see a trend toward increasingly tight organization among these domestic Chinese trafficking networks, the language they use to describe domestic Chinese drug trafficking networks still does not portray these groups as being nearly as well-organized and powerful as the international rings with which they collaborate. Guo and Mei's views on this point may reflect the realities of these trafficking rings. They may also, however, reflect the long-standing hesitancy of Chinese law enforcement officials to concede that domestic organized crime in China might be reaching the levels of organization or power seen in Russia, Nigeria, Pakistan, or other highly corrupted societies.
Indications of Sino-Pakistani and Sino-Afghan Law Enforcement Cooperation
Guo 
ENGLISH ABSTRACT (as printed in original text)
"With the significant increase of opium yield in Afghanistan, drug trafficking groups home and abroad colluded with each other to build up an international passage into Xinjiang by organizations and deliberately. A situation has come into being where commands are from abroad, permeation into central Asia, transferring in Xinjiang, and wholesale in Guangdong and Shanghai. The penetration of drugs into Xinjiang has many outlets and is secret, professional, and international. The threat of drugs from 'Golden Crescent' has exceeded that from the traditional drug area 'Golden Triangle'. The narcotics control in Xinjiang faces a huge test and challenge."
ARTICLE TEXT ONE: THE SITUATION CONCERNING THE SMUGGLING AND INFILTRATION OF GOLDEN CRESCENT DRUGS INTO XINJIANG.
In recent years, following the gradual contraction in the production of illegal drugs in the Golden Triangle region, illegal drug production within the Golden Crescent-which has Afghanistan as its core-has climbed year after year (zhunian pansheng; i^^| :^/ |). Afghanistan has already become the world's leader in opium poppy cultivation and opium production. Spurred by violence and [market] demand. Golden Crescent heroin has become the most attractive substitute for Golden Triangle heroin. Foreign drug selling groups illegally entrenched in the Golden Crescent have stepped up their drugrunning into our country, and Xinjiang in the Northwestern border province region has been "bearing the brunt of the attack." With the unceasing increase in cultivation, processing, and transshipment activities in Afghanistan, Xinjiang has already become one of the four major export transit routes for illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent. The illegal drug situation in the Golden Crescent Central Asia region already constitutes an ongoing threat to Xinjiang.
In terms of geographical conditions, Xinjiang's borders are adjacent to eight countries in Central Asia and South Asia, it has 17 Category One open border entry points (yi lei kaifang kou'an; ^^JFS^npr), and it is regarded as our country's bridgehead and important gateway to the markets of Central and South Asia. Through many years of development, Xinjiang has already formed trade routes that combine highways, railways, and airlines. Transnational drug trafficking groups have coveted Xinjiang for a long time (chuixian yijiu; ^^LiX), and hope, via these convenient trade routes, to "borrow the road to Xinjiang" in order to achieve their evil goals of crossing borders to sell drugs transnationally. Xinjiang's special geographical position, long borderlines, and crossborder ethnic and religious linkages would be extremely easy for international drug traffickers to keep an eye on, and with regard to East Asian drug trafficking networks, Xinjiang is becoming the link-up point to get through to Afghanistan, from which illegal drugs originate.
Following the great increase in Afghan opium production levels and the progressive opening up of many international drug trafficking routes out of Afghanistan through our territory, there has been a dramatic increase in the Golden Crescent heroin that has come across Xinjiang's border. These [drugs] quickly snapped up the illegal drug exchanges and consumption markets in Xinjiang, and soon this heroin even exceeded the market position of traditional Golden Triangle heroin. Xinjiang is now the frontline base in the campaign to block up the source and dam up the river (duyuan jieliu; tUMWM*), and Xinjiang's anti-drug work is facing enormous tests and challenges.
As we look at the situation of Golden Crescent drugs being smuggled into Xinjiang, we can clearly divide the time into two stages: from 1991 to 2004, and from 2005 to the present.
From June 4, 1991-when Xinjiang cracked its first case of smuggling illegal Golden Crescent drugs across the border-until 2004, the concerned government departments in Xinjiang cracked more than 20 cases involving illegal drugs, and have uncovered and seized a total of:
• 127.550 kilos of Golden Crescent heroin, opium, and marijuana {mayan; M'M),
• More than 66 tons of the precursor chemical acetic anhydride {cusucmgan; WiW.
iff) being smuggled out of the border.
• 800,000 tabs of the psychoactive drug amfepramone (Jingshen yaopin anfeilatong; Commission and the Regional Public Security Bureau have also taken very seriously the work of investigating drug smuggling, and they have ceaselessly increased their investment and strengthened their professional work (in this area). They have built up their corps, and also continued deepening anti-drug propaganda work regarding the "people's war against drugs," "activities to build drug-free counties and cities," all aimed at the Golden Crescent. Given the reality that drug smuggling and infiltration are becoming more prominent every day, such departments as the Public Security Border Defense, Railway Security, Transport Security, and Aviation Security, the Customs departments, the Post Office, and other departments-all under the direct leadership of the [Xinjiang] Autonomous Region Public Security Bureau's Anti-Drug Corps (jindu zongdui; i£%&\>k)-have strengthened their campaign to "block up the source and dam up the river," and struggle forcefully against the Golden Crescent. They have achieved definite results in blocking and intercepting illegal drugs outside of the border {dupin dujie zai jingwai; wuhtfSMtt^t'l'), investigating and seizing [drugs] in the border regions, and organizing and carrying out stern blows anti-drug crime activities that have as their key elements "attacking gangs," "cracking major cases," "destroying networks," "arresting drug lords" (duxiao; %$k), and "seizing drug money" (Ji dnzi; t^nf^ /. The objective of transporting drugs is to travel through Xinjiang on to Guangdong, Shanghai, and other places.
According to several reports provided by the Pakistani police, it has been revealed that out of a group of 22 cases of attempted smuggling of illegal Golden Crescent drugs to China that were cracked by Pakistani police in 2005, those involving Xinjiang numbered 13, or 59.09 per cent of the total. In 2006, out of 58 such cases cracked in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Xinjiang-related cases accounted for 55.17 percent. Of the Xinjiang Golden Crescent drug cases investigated and handled during those two years, most of them were using Xinjiang as a transfer point (zhongzhuan dian: 't 1 H )\i ) or as a "point of consumption" (xiaofei di; 'M H-Hil), the remainder moved [the drugs] on to Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing and other such places, with the greatest concentration of them moving along on the route from Urumqi on to Guangzhou. After the drugs arrived in Guangzhou, they were primarily transferred to Nigerians and other persons of African citizenship (Ni ri liya dengfeizhouji renyuan; /S 0 ^U4F.^^#t|fn Ab\) to be sold.
//. Drug transshipment lines follow many routes.
The first route is via public highway through border entry points. Since 2000, the Xinjiang Border Defense, Customs, and other departments have cracked more than 20 cases of drug smuggling through border entry points via public highways.
The major public highways that are used for drug smuggling are:
• From Pakistan-to Kunjerab [Konjirap] (Hongqilapu; tl-Kfi^f)-to Kashgar (Kashi; H §ff)-to Urumqi.
• From Tajikistan-to Karasu (Kalasu; i^fe^)-to Kashgar (Kashi; n^rff)-to Urumqi.
• From Kyrgyzstan-to Tuergate (ftt/J^#)-to Kashgar-to Urumqi
• From Bishkek (Bishekaike; btifWifo) to Urumqi.
Among these cases, the key border entry point for drug smuggling has been Kunjerab (Konjirap/Hongqilapu) on the China-Pakistan border, where illegal drugs being smuggled across the border from Pakistan were seized on repeated occasions. At present, there is a very apparent trend toward the internationalization of the personnel who transport illegal drugs from the Golden Crescent. They have expanded from the past, when they primarily used persons of Pakistani nationality, to increasingly using persons of Afghan, "Central Asian," African, and other nationalities, and this is gradually transforming into Golden Crescent drug lords in Central Asian and related countries carrying out the direction and organization of Pakistani, Afghan, and other persons to move the drugs across the border into Urumqi. In Urumqi they change hands, or are moved directly on to Guangzhou, where they are transferred to African personnel who carry out processing on them for sale within [China's] IV. The tactics and methods used to keep illegal drug transshipments covert are changing in many ways.
The "covertization" of methods for illegal drug transshipment. Illegal drug trafficking organizations from the earliest times have employed the luggage and goods of travelers entering and exiting borders to move illegal drugs. Today, this trend has developed to the point of using every method including transportation vehicles with large shipments concealed inside, large shipments of goods containing contraband {da zong huowujiadai; A'^tS^J^'ff?), transshipment inside the human body {ren ti fan yun; KW^JSL) and other methods, so that the means of transshipping drugs to become more covert by the day. At the same time drug trafficking organizations are actively inquiring about the investigatory and inspection methods and tactics used by our departments, and continuously transforming their methods for concealing illegal drugs.
V. The Processing Techniques (for Handling Illegal Drugs/ are Becoming Increasingly Professionalized.
Based on an analysis of the internal and external packaging of these illegal drugs, some of the heroin has been processed and packaged by foreign international drug trafficking groups using professional packaging equipment; their granules are uniform and even, the packages are shaped like dates (leisi zao zhuang; ^iU^-^k), and they possess the capacity to weaken the effectiveness of fluoroscopy. The internal packaging is white transparent plastic, although for the external packaging they use beige-colored [lit. "rice yellow colored"] plastic. They are acid-resistant {kang suan xing; fMMfi.), and can last a long time without suffering deterioration from human gastric juices {weiye; n'M).
VI. The Languages /of the Traffickers] are Proliferating
Because of the many languages that are mixed together [among the traffickers]-including English, Urdu, Persian, African tribal languages (bulno yuyan; nP^ip-g"), Pakistani and Afghan dialects-their contacts are increasingly secretive (lianxi geng wei
